Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?

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dc.contributor.author	Hefeker, Carsten
dc.contributor.author	Zimmer, Blandine
dc.date.accessioned	2025-09-23T16:09:46Z
dc.date.created	2010
dc.date.issued	2024-01-02
dc.date.updated	2023-12-21
dc.description.abstract	This paper revisits the trade-off between central bank indepen- dence and conservatism using a New Keynesian model with uncertainty about the central banker's output gap target. It is shown that when this uncertainty is high, the trade-off no longer holds. In this case, the optimal combination between independence and conservatism is characterised by complementarity.	en
dc.format.extent	15
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	en
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0031
dc.identifier.govdoc	urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-00318
dc.identifier.issn	1867-3678
dc.identifier.other	es/2024/0031
dc.identifier.uri	https://open.uni-marburg.de/handle/10.17192/es.2024.0031
dc.language	English	en
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.language.rfc3066	en
dc.publisher	Philipps-Universität Marburg
dc.relation.ispartof	es/2023/0167
dc.rights.uri	https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject	Central bank independence	de
dc.subject	Conservatism	de
dc.subject	Transparency of monetary policy.	de
dc.subject.ddc	330
dc.title	Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?	en
dc.type	Work	en
dspace.entity.type	Item	en
local.publisher.address	Deutschhausstraße 9, 35037 Marburg
local.publisher.place	Marburg
local.umr.fachbereich	Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
local.umr.institut	Wirtschaftswissenschaften

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