The Evolution of Collaboration in Symmetric 2x2-Games with Imperfect Recognition of Types
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Abstract
A recent series of papers has introduced a fresh perspective on the
problem of the evolution of human cooperation by suggesting an
amendment to the concept of cooperation itself: instead of thinking
of cooperation as playing a particular strategy in a given game, usually
C in the prisoner's dilemma, we could also think of cooperation
as collaboration, i.e. as coalitional strategy choice, such as jointly
switching from (D;D) to (C;C). The present paper complements
previous work on collaboration by expanding on its genericity while
relaxing the assumption that collaborators are able to perfectly identify
their own kind. Conditions for the evolutionary viability of such
collaboration under fairly undemanding assumptions about population
and interaction structure are derived. Doing so, this paper
shows that collaboration is an adaptive principle of strategy choice
in a broad range of niches, i.e., stochastic mixtures of games.
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This item has been published with the following license: In Copyright